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Article: 
Included among the many topics on which Aristotle writes in the Nicomachean Ethics is an account of 
incontinence or akrasia. Many controversies have arisen among interpreters of Aristotle on this issue, and a 
few of these disputes will be discussed in this paper. In the first part of this paper I shall indicate the usual 
way of reading Aristotle's account of incontinence, which I shall call the natural interpretation. In the second 
section I shall raise some apparent difficulties with the natural interpretation by pointing out three passages 
in the Nicomachean Ethics which seem to be inconsistent with it. Finally, in the concluding three sections of 
this paper I shall argue that the three passages allegedly inconsistent with the natural interpretation can be 
shown to be consistent with the general line of argument that the natural interpretation takes Aristotle to be 
following. In showing how these passages can be reconciled with the usual way of reading Aristotle's 
account of akrasia, a much clearer and more complete picture of what his view is emerges. In addition, this 
reading makes Aristotle's account of incontinence more philosophically acceptable – though it is not without 
its problems — than it is normally supposed to be. 
 
Part I 
What I shall call the natural interpretation of Aristotle's account of incontinence is taken from the 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1146b 30 - 1147b 19.
1
 In these pages Aristotle cites four different cases. Three of these 
cases show how one can act contrary to one's knowledge of how he ought to behave, and the fourth can be 
read as an explanation of incontinence. In the first passage (1146b 30-34) Aristotle distinguishes between 
one who has knowledge but is not exercising it, and one who has knowledge and is exercising it. Aristotle 
says that it would be strange to say that one knows what he ought to do and is exercising that knowledge but 
is still acting contrary to it. On the other hand, it is not at all strange to say that one knows what he ought to 
do but is acting contrary to it when he is not exercising that knowledge. Next (1146b 35 - 1147a 10) Aristotle 
discusses the practical syllogism. Such a syllogism has two premises, a universal one stating what ought to 
be done and a particular one that applies to the specific case at hand. In discussing these premises Aristotle is 
pointing out two different kinds of knowledge that are relevant in knowing what to do on a particular 
occasion. The first kind is knowledge of a general rule or principle of what one ought to do that is relevant to 
the particular situation, and the second is knowledge of the circumstances of the particular situation. Aristotle 
suggests that the so-called incontinent man either lacks knowledge or is not using knowledge of a particular 
premise (but not the universal premise). It would not be strange, Aristotle claims, for one to act incontinently 
if he lacked or was not exercising knowledge of the particular premise. But such incontinent action would be 
extraordinary if one both knew and was using knowledge of both premises. Thirdly (1147a 10 - 1147a 24) 
Aristotle indicates that there are certain cases in which we want to say that in a sense one has knowledge but 
in another sense that same person does not have knowledge. Examples of such a case are when a man is 
asleep, drunk, or mad. Analogously, Aristotle wants to hold, the incontinent person, under the influence of 
passions, in some sense has but yet does not have knowledge. All three of these cases, then, show how it is 
possible for one to act contrary to his knowledge of how he ought to behave. In all three cases such an action 
can only ensue if there is a defect in some form of knowledge other than the universal premise; that is, one 
fails to know something in his particular situation or does not exercise the knowledge that he has, though 
what he fails to know is not a general principle of how he ought to behave. Such a person in some sense has 
knowledge, but in another sense does not. 
 
The fourth case (1147a 25 – 1147b 19) can be taken as an explanation of akrasia.
2
 The incontinent person 
knows the general principle that applies to his particular situation. The appetites interfere, however, and 
either prevent him from knowing that he is in a situation to which the general principle applies or prevent 
him from exercising his knowledge about the particular circumstances, One might say, with Santas,
3
 that this 
fourth case explains akrasia in that it not only shows that the incontinent man does not have knowledge in 
the full and conplete sense, but it also indicates why the incontinent man acts the way that he does; viz., he 
follows the dictates of his appetites. 
 
Weakness of the will, then, is only possible because the incontinent man does not have knowledge in the full 
and complete sense. There is some sense in which he knows that he ought not to behave in the way that he 
does, but because he does not have or is not exercising knowledge about the particular situation he fails to 
act on this general knowledge of how he ought to behave, Given this, it seems that Aristotle holds the 
Socratic view that action contrary to full and complete knowledge of how one ought to behave is impossible. 
Any apparent case of weakness of the will can be shown to be a case where the agent's knowledge is 




Had Aristotle's account of akrasia not gone beyond 1146b 30 - 1147b 19 there would probably be much less 
dispute about the accuracy of the above interpretation than there actually is. There are, however, other 
comments which Aristotle makes with regard to incontinence which seem inconsistent with the natural 
interpretation. The first of these that I shall mention occurs in Book VII, Chapter 7 of the Nicomachean 
Ethics. 
 
(A) Of incontinence one kind is impetuousity, another weakness. For some men after deliberating 
fail, owing to their emotion, to stand by the conclusions of their deliberation, others because they 
have not deliberated are led by their emotion ... (1150b 19-22) 
 
The reason that this passage does not seem to be consistent with the natural interpretation is that it seems to 
allow for a kind of incontinence that is ruled out by the natural interpretation. On the natural interpretation a 
person behaves incontinently because he does not have or is not exercising one of the parts of the practical 
syllogism necessary for completing his deliberation. That of which he lacks knowledge or of which he is not 
exercising his knowledge is the minor premise of the practical syllogism, i.e., the particular premise about 
his present situation. On the natural interpretation this premise is obscured by passion. Impetuous 
incontinence, mentioned in passage (A), is easily explained in terms of the natural interpretaion. The 
impetuous man, led by emotion, does not deliberate or does not complete deliberation. But it does not seem 
that the type of incontinence called weakness can be accounted for on the natural interpretation. If one 
assumes, as it initially seems plausible to do, that deliberation is like reasoning via the practical syllogism in 
that both are reasoning about action, and if the conclusion of both the practical syllogism and deliberation is 
an action, then the incontinent man could not reach a conclusion about what he ought to do without also 
doing it, But this seems to be just what Aristotle says the weak incontinent man does. This may lead one to 
say, then, that the conclusion of a practical syllogism or of deliberation is not an action but rather a resolution 
or a decision to act. But this move runs into problems too. On the natural interpretaion incontinence is due to 
an ignorance of or failure to exercise the minor premise. But if that is the case, then how could the weak 
incontinent man draw the conclusion at all? And if one does in fact draw the conclusion and yet act contrary 
to it, as it seems the weak incontinent man does, then it seems that knowledge is being dragged about like a 
slave, and this is apparently inconsistent with what Aristotle says in Chapter 3 of Book VII (1147b 16-17). 
So it seems either that Aristotle is inconsistent, that the natural interpretation is incorrect, or that passage (A) 
must be construed in some other way. 
 
A second passage which seems to be incompatible with the natural interpretation is the following. 
 
(B) And generally incontinence and vice are different in kind; vice is unconscious of itself, 
incontinence is not. (1150b 35-36) 
 
Passage (B) seems to indicate that the incontinent man is conscious that he is incontinent; that is, he must 
know that he is incontinent. But if the incontinent man has such knowledge then he must be aware that he is 
in a position to act on his knowledge of a general principle of how he ought to behave. Otherwise he would 
not realize that he is acting contrary to the principle. But again it is just this case which the natural 
interpretation does not allow. That is, on the natural interpretation one never acts contrary to a general 
principle of how he ought to act knowing that the principle applies in that situation. It seems reasonable to 
say, then, that the incontinent man is not conscious of his incontinence. But passage (B) seems to assert the 
contrary. So, as in the case with passage (A), either Aristotle is inconsistent, the natural interpretation is 
incorrect, or passage (B) must be construed in some other way. 
 
A third passage which appears to be inconsistent with the natural interpretation is found in Book I, Chapter 
13 of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
 
(C) There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul – one which in a sense, however, 
shares in a rational principle. For we praise the rational principle of the continent man and the 
incontinent, and the part of their soul that has such a principle, since it urges them aright and towards 
the best objects; but there Is found in them also another element naturally opposed to the rational 
principle, which fights against and resists that principle. (1102b 13-19) 
 
This passage seems to say that in both continence and incontinence the agent is in a state of conflicting 
motivations. In the case of the continent person the rational principle wins out and determines the action. In 
the case of the incontinent man the rational principle is occasionally defeated by appetite.
4
 The reason that 
passage (C) seems to be worrisome is that on the natural interpretation there is no genuine conflict between 
reason and appetite in incontinence. Since the incontinent man does not recognize that he is in a position to 
act on his general principles, he is not moved to do so. Since appetite is the only operant motivation in the 
incontinent man, there is no conflict of motivation. Further, if there were a conflict between rational 
motivation and appetite, arid if the latter could overcome the former, as this passage seems to indicate is 
possible, then it would seem that knowledge could be dragged about like a slave. But Aristotle seems to rule 
out this possibility at 1147b 16-18. So, either Aristotle is inconsistent, the natural interpretation is incorrect, 
or passage (C) must be interpreted in some other way. 
 
Part III 
The question now arises, is there any way to reconcile passages (A), (B), and (C) with the natural 
interpretation? When one considers that passages (A) and (B) occur so close to Book VII, Chapter 3, it 
would be extraordinary if these two passages were blatantly inconsistent with the natural interpretation. One 
does not need to assume that great philosophers are infallible in order to doubt that such an inconsistency 
would occur. If one operates with even a weak principle of charity one will surely want to take another look 
at these apparently inconsistent passages. In this case one surely does not want to say, at least at the outset, 
that this is just another example of Aristotle being inconsistent. It is much more reasonable to re-examine 
both the natural interpretation and these three passages before one charges Aristotle with being inconsistent. 
I shall try to argue that passages (A), (B), and (C) are not incompatible with the natural interpretation.
5
 What 
is important, though, is that in showing that these passages are compatible with the natural interpretation one 
gets a much clearer picture of what Aristotle's account of akrasia really is. And the picture that emerges is 
one that makes Aristotle's view much less counterintuitive than it ordinarily is supposed to be. In addition, 
not only are there passages in the Nicomachean Ethics which support my claim that Aristotle avoids this 
apparent inconsistency, but also several things that he says in his Politics lend even more credence to my 
reading. So I want to argue that the natural interpretation is not incorrect, but is rather incomplete. In 
showing that the three passages in question can be reconciled with the natural interpretation, one gets a more 
complete account of Aristotle's view. 
 
Let us look first at passage (B). The problem that (B) presents is if the incontinent man can view himself as 
acting contrary to a general principle of how he ought to behave, then he must be aware that he is in a 
position to act on his knowledge of such a principle. If he is aware that he is in such a situation then he must 
both have and be exercising knowledge of all the elements of the practical syllogism, including the particular 
premise. But, of course, on the natural interpretation the incontinent person either does not have or is not 
exercising knowledge of the particular premise. If one takes Aristotle's claim that "incontinence is conscious 
of itself" to mean that the incontinent man is aware of or knows that he is behaving incontinently at the time 
of his behavior, then the passage seems to be inconsistent with the natural interpretation. One obvious move 
to make in order to save Aristotle is simply to posit a time lag and say that the incontinent man is aware of 
his incontinence only after-the-fact. Construed this way, passage (B) would be consistent with the natural 
interpretation. But to posit a time lag merely for the sake of rendering the passage consistent with the natural 
interpretation would surely be ad hoc. One must give other reasons for supposing that there is such a time 
lag. One such reason is the following. If one take Aristotle's claim "Incontinent men are aware of their 
incontinence (either at the time of or after-the-fact)" to refer to all incontinent men,
6
 then the impetuous man 
must be aware of his incontinence. Since the impetuous man is one who does not deliberate at all but is 
simply led by his emotions (1150b 20-22), it does not seem that he could possibly be aware of his 
incontinence at the time of the act. At the very least it would seem that in order to know that one ought to do 
an action A at time T one would have to have active knowledge of the general principle, the particular 
premise(s), and the conclusion (one ought to do A) which follows from them. In order for these conditions to 
be fulfilled, one would have to complete deliberation. Since the impetuous man does not deliberate at all (at 
least when he behaves incontinently), surely he could not be aware of incontinence at the time that he is 
behaving incontinently. But clearly even the impetuous man could be aware that he behaved incontinently 
after-the-fact. In fact, he would have to be capable of being aware of it after-the-fact, since according to 
Aristotle incontinent men repent (1150b 30). So I think that this provides one with a good reason to read in a 
time lag and hence be able to reconcile passage (B) with the natural interpretation. 
 
A second way to try to render passage (B) compatible with the natural interpretation involves construing 
incontinence as a disposition.
7
 One might ask why, on Aristotle's view, can the vicious man not be aware of 
his vice (either at the time or after-the-fact). Aristotle clearly takes virtue and vice to be dispositions. So one 
could take the claim "vice is unconscious of itself" to mean either that the vicious man is not aware at the 
time of his act that it is vicious, or that the vicious man is not aware that he is disposed to act viciously. 
Either of these readings is plausible, since, I think, Aristotle would hold them both and for the same reason. 
If the vicious Man 'were aware of his vice, he would know that he was behaving contrary to universal moral 
principles and hence his behavior would be irrational (since he would have chosen to behave contrary to 
reason). Such behavior would be incomprehensible to Aristotle. If in fact Aristotle intended this passage to 
mean, that the vicious man is not aware that he disposed to do vicious acts, then it would be reasonable to 
say that he meant that the incontinent man is aware that he is disposed to behave incontinently. Off hand I 
see no reason for favoring one interpretation over the other, except that the latter gives one another reading 
of (B) which is compatible with the natural interpretation. It should be pointed out that this second way of 
showing how the incontinent man could be conscious of his incontinence is compatible with the first that I 
suggested. That is, there might be two senses in which the incontinent man is aware of his incontinence. He 
may be aware after-the-fact that a particular action was an incontinent one, and he may be aware in general 
that he is disposed to behave incontinently. The former sense of awareness could account for such 
phenomena as remorse and regret, which Aristotle claims that the incontinent person experiences. Given this, 
the latter way of explaining how the incontinent man is aware of his incontinence may well be unnecessary. 
 
Perhaps one reason for retaining both types of awareness – though by no means a conclusive reason – is that 
Aristotle frequently compares the incontinent person to the drunk (e.g., 1147a 18). It is surely true that an 
habitual drunkard is aware after-the-fact that he was drunk, and he also knows that he is disposed to get 
drunk. So perhaps the same is true of the incontinent person. It does seem, though, that in some cases a drunk 
person is also aware that he is drunk or getting drunk at the time of the act. And if Aristotle said this about 
the incontinent person, that would obviously seem to be inconsistent with the natural interpretation. One 
could, of course, assert that in this respect the analogy between the drunk and the incontinent person breaks 
down or is not applicable. But that would surely be too ad hoc, I shall, however, suggest later (section V) 
that even this aspect of the analogy between the drunk and the incontinent person can be handled in a way 
that is consistent with the natural interpretation. This will give one an additional reading of passage (B) that 
renders it consistent with the natural interpretation, and, in a qualified sense, will make the reading in of a 
time-lag unnecessary. But independent of this, I think that I have shown that there are two readings of 
passage (B) that are plausible and that render it consistent with the natural interpretation. Clearly, the latter of 
the two that I suggested is more dubious. One might well argue that claiming that passage (B) can be taken in 
both of these senses is simply to make it more complicated than it really is. In any case, I think that the first 
interpretation that I put forth is sufficiently supported by the text to indicate that the time lag should be read 
in and that (B) is indeed consistent with the natural interpretation. 
 
Part IV 
But is there any plausible way to save (A)? How could the incontinent man deliberate and still act contrary to 
the conclusion of his deliberation? It sounds like knowledge is being dragged about like a slave, and 
Aristotle denies that this is possible (1147b 17-18). It seems that there are two ways that one might claim 
could reconcile this passage with the natural interpretation. One line that one might argue is that while the 
completion of deliberation does at least sometimes involve full and complete knowledge, nevertheless part of 
this knowledge (though not the universal moral principle) can be temporarily lost. A second line that one 
might suggest is that just completing the process of deliberation does not itself constitute full and complete 
knowledge; that is, one may conclude deliberation and still not have full and complete knowledge of what he 
ought to do. I shall suggest that there are some textual grounds for holding that Aristotle has both of these 
lines of argument in mind. I shall, however, argue that the latter line can handle all cases of incontinent 
actions, while the former approach cannot. 
 
The first line of argument is suggested by Gerasimos Santas. Santas points out
8
 that what the incontinent 
man is ignorant of, according to Aristotle, is not the general rule or universal moral principle (see 1147b 14-
20 and the note to this passage). Rather his ignorance is of a particular premise or conclusion that brings the 
particular thing done under the general rule. So when, at 1147b 14-20, Aristotle says that "knowledge 
proper" is not dragged about like a slave, he means the universal premise. Rather, in the incontinent person 
passion overcomes what Aristotle calls perceptual knowledge, knowledge of one of the particular premises. 
So what Santas says is that before passion was aroused the incontinent person knew in a straightforward 
sense that he should or should not do the act in question. And after the passion ceases he once again knows 
what he should have done. So Santas concludes that "the man may know the rule, and may have the 
information but may not be exercising his knowledge of such information due to the influence of passion."
9
 
This makes it sound like one can pass from a state of knowledge to one of ignorance and back to knowledge. 
And indeed Aristotle says, "The explanation of how the ignorance is dissolved and the incontinent man 
regains his knowledge, is the same as in the case of the man drunk or asleep and is not particular to this 
condition ...." (1147b 5-9, italics mine) This passage seems to indicate that Aristotle does allow that one can 
pass from a state of knowledge to ignorance and back to knowledge. So, with regard to (A), one may 
deliberate and know, fully and completely it seems, what one should do, but the passions arise and distort 
one's knowledge of the particular premise or conclusion so that one behaves wrongly because of temporary 
ignorance. And since one is temporarily ignorant of a particular premise he does not know that the moral 
principle in question applies to his situation. Knowledge proper, therefore, has not been dragged about like a 
slave. The fact that the ignorance of the incontinent man is frequently compared to the ignorance of a drunk 
may lend plausibility to this interpretatiion, since in some sense it seems that a drunk has full and complete 
knowledge both before and after his drunkenness. 
 
I think that this line of reasoning will account for two kinds of incontinent actions that the weak man might 
perform; that is, this line of reasoning shows that two of the possible types of incontinent action of the weak 
person are compatible with the natural interpretation. Both are actions with regard to which there is a time 
before the action when the agent is contemplating doing the action, but is subsequently overcome by passion. 
First, if the correct conclusion of one's deliberation is of the form "P should not do action A", and if there is a 
competing desire which moves one to do A in spite of the fact that it is forbidden, then as long as the 
possibility of doing A exists the elements of one's moral deliberation must be active and exercised if P is to 
abstain from doing A. So if the possibility of doing A were present for a long period of time, then it may not 
be unreasonable to think that one could lose some particular knowledge over that period. Secondly, if the 
conclusion of one's deliberation is of the form "P should do action A" where A is an act that P will not have 
an occasion or opportunity to perform until some later time T, then again there is a time lag and it does not 
seem unreasonable to suppose that a competing desire could eventually cloud and distort one's knowledge of 
one or more of the particular premises. So either of these two types of incontinent action of the weak man 
seems to be explicable and consistent with the natural interpretation. 
 
There is a third type of incontinent action, however, that I think the above line of reasoning cannot account 
for. It is just that case in which the conclusion of deliberation is "P should do A" where A is an action to be 
done now, but the weak incontinent man fails to do A in spite of the fact that he has completed deliberation 
and knows, in some sense, that he ought to do A. In this case it does not seem plausible to say that one has 
but then loses knowledge of one of the particular premise(s), since there is no significant time lag between 
the time that one deliberates and the time that the action is to be done. If such knowledge could be lost 
without a time lag, then one wonders in what sense one ever actively had the knowledge to begin with. This 
case, I think, must be handled by the second line of reasoning to which I alluded earlier. Suppose, then, that 
one has deliberated and the conclusion of his deliberation is "Do A" where A is an action to be done now. If 
concluding deliberation alone is sufficient for full and complete knowledge, then on the natural interpretation 
it is hard to see how one could fail to do A in this case. And yet surely the case of weakness that Aristotle 
describes must allow for this type of incontinent action. It would be much too ad hoc to say that weakness 
applies only to the first two types of actions described above. This would be tantamount of claiming that in 
the case of the weak incontinent person there must always be a lag between the time the agent deliberates 
and the time that he behaves incontinently. I know of no textual grounds for supporting this claim, and 
without such grounds the move seems suspect. Perhaps, then, one can show that an agent's having gone 
through the process of deliberation is not alone sufficient for saying that that agent has full and complete 
knowledge. But what else might be needed to have full and complete knowledge? At various places Aristotle 
distinguishes between natural virtue and virtue produced by habituation. He does so, for example, at 1151a 
17-19. And at the outset of Book II, Chapter I, Aristotle draws a distinction between intellectual virtue and 
moral virtue, claiming that the latter comes about as a result of habit. In addition, in the Politics (1332a 40) 
Aristotle says that nature, habit, and rational principle are the three things that make one good and virtuous. 
It might be that with regard to at least some cases being properly habituated is necessary before one can 
correctly say that a person has full and complete knowledge. Part of what counts as full and complete 
knowledge may include something like a strong disposition to act on one's principles; that is, one's principles 
must be fully integrated into one's character. The following seems to suggest that Aristotle may well have 
held this view. 
 
.... since some men (just as people who first tickle others are not tickled themselves), if they have first 
perceived and seen what is coming and have first roused themselves and their calculative faculty, are 
not defeated by their emotion, whether it be pleasant or painful. (1150b 21-24) 
 
This passage, which one might call the "tickling passage," suggests that Aristotle held that one difference 
between the continent person and the weak incontinent person is that the former realizes that the passions 
will be aroused and takes the appropriate steps to ward them off, while the latter does not see the coming 
dangers. 
 
On this reading what the tickling passage suggests is that not only does one have to have knowledge of the 
moral principle in question, but one must also be properly habituated if action in accordance with the moral 
principle is to be guaranteed. This same point is made more explicitly in the Politics. As I indicated earlier, 
in the Politics (1132a 40) Aristotle says that nature, habit, and rational principle are the three things that 
make men good and virtuous. Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes that these three things must be in harmony 
with one another. Aristotle first makes a general point about the relation of means and ends. 
 
There are two things in which all well-being consists: one of them is the choice of a right end and aim 
of action, and the other the discovery of the actions which are means towards it; for the means and 
the end may agree or disagree. (1331b 26-30, Jowett translation) 
 
The point here is that both the end chosen and the means toward that end must be right or correct. If either is 
wrong, one may fail to attain the good life. And this applies specifically to nature, habit, and rational 
principle. At 1332b 5-7 Aristotle says, "Wherefore nature, habit, and rational principle must be in harmony 
with one another; for they do not always agree ...." The implication is that even if rational principle has the 
correct end in mind, it is at least possible that the failure to be properly habituated can cause an agent to fail 
to be virtuous or do what he ought to do. This is made explicit at 1334b 10-12. "The rational principle may 
be mistaken and fail in attaining the highest ideal of life, and there may be a like evil influence of habit." 
Habit and rational principle must be concordant. Unless both are adapted to the right end, one may fail to be 
good. So it is possible for one to know the end that ought to be achieved, and yet fail to act in accordance 
with this knowledge. If being properly habituated is a necessary element of full and complete knowledge, 
then this is not inconsistent with the natural interpretation. This gives one an explanation of how the weak 
incontinent man can deliberate and still act contrary to the conclusion of his deliberation. 
 
Perhaps an example would help to clarify the point being made here. Borrowing one of Aristotle's quaint 
examples, one may take "All sweet things should be avoided'' as a universal moral principle. Given this, one 
must realize that certain passions will be aroused which are contrary to this general principle. As a result one 
must take certain steps which will enable one in each particular case to ward off these passions and act in 
accord with the moral principle. But the incontinent man fails to take these steps. So when he is in the 
appropriate situation, deliberates, and draws the conclusion "Do not do A", at the same time the contrary 
passion is aroused which would move him to do A (in the example, to eat the sweet). Since he has not taken 
the appropriate steps to ward off this passion, he fails to do what he ought to do. This is not a case of 
knowledge proper being dragged about like a slave, because the agent in question does not have full and 
complete knowledge. I am assuming, of course, that knowledge proper and full and complete knowledge are 
the same. This amounts to assuming that Aristotle's notion of knowledge proper involves a strong sense of 
the term 'knowledge'. This certainly seems to be true of Aristotle's notion of scientific knowledge. This is 
brought out clearly in Book I, Chapter 6 of the Posterior Analytics (74b 26-39). It is even more explicit, 
though, in a passage from the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle claims that "those who have just begun to learn 
a science can string together its phrases, but do not yet know it; for it has to become a part of themselves, and 
that takes time" (1147a 21-23). So if one has scientific knowledge it must be fully integrated in him and a 
definite part of himself. Since Aristotle limits knowledge proper in science to this strong sense of the term, it 
is not unreasonable to suppose that he does so in the realm of ethics as well. This would not violate 
Aristotle's claim (at 1094b 15-26) that knowledge in the latter realm is less precise that knowledge in the 
former. But, one may object, on this reading the incontinent man does not have knowledge of the general 
moral principle, and Aristotle claims that he does have such knowledge (1145b 13). I think, however, that 
this objection can be met. It is surely true that one can know p without knowing all of the logical 
consequences of p. In an analogous manner, it seems possible that one could know (at least in the 
propositional sense of the term) a moral principle without knowing all of the steps that he needs to take in 
order to be able to adhere to that principle. In such a case one could say that the incontinent man knows the 
moral principle, but his knowledge is not knowledge in the full and complete sense. The tickling passage 
suggests that this is the case with the weak incontinent man, and the passages that cited earlier from the 
Politics lend support to this. It should be recalled that what I have said here has been directed at those 
incontinent actions that involve no time lag between the time of deliberation and the time when the agent 
fails to do what he ought to do. But this analysis applies just as well to the cases where there is a time lag. 
That is, one might explain the failure to act on the conclusion of one's deliberation where there is a time lag 
between the time of the deliberation and the time when the action could be carried out in the same way that I 
have suggested for the case where there is no time lag. The agent does not have full and complete knowledge 
in the sense that he is not properly habituated. More interestingly, the second line of reasoning car) 
consistently explain the cases where there is a time lag in the same way that the first line does. On the second 
line one would simply add that the reason knowledge of the particular premise(s) becomes clouded is that the 
agent is not properly habituated. But the first approach cannot handle cases where there is no time lag, and 
the second line can. So it seems that the second line of reasoning suggested to reconcile passage (A) with the 
natural interpretation is the stronger one. 
 
There is yet another reason for preferring the second approach of reconciling passage (A) with the natural 
interpretation to the first one. If one were limited to the first line of reasoning it is hard to see how one could 
account for the genuine conflict between reason and appetite that is suggested by passage (C). The reason 
that there could be no genuine conflict on this view is that reason and appetite are never operative at the same 
time. One is moved by appetite because one does not, at that time, have knowledge of some particular 
circumstance(s). In the absence of such knowledge the agent does not know that the moral principle in 
question applies to his situation. So he is not at that time moved to act on that principle. And if he were not 
so moved it would seem that there is no genuine conflict here. By contrast, the second approach allows for 
the genuine conflict that passage (C) indicates occurs (as I shall argue in section V). 
 
There are, however, at least two objections that can be raised against what I have just argued. First, is it the 
case that the incontinent person knows that he ought to take steps to ward off the oncoming passions? If he 
does know that he ought to do this and yet fails to do so, then it seems that his failure to do what he ought to 
do is a case of incontinence which the natural interpretation has ruled out. In other words, from the general 
moral principle "One ought to do A" there seems to be something of a derived obligation that one ought to 
take all those steps that are necessary to enable one to do A. If one knows that he has this derived obligation 
but fails to adhere to it, then one has a case of incontinence that Aristotle says is not possible, at least 
according to the natural interpretation. If one tried to explain this latter incontinent action in terms of another 
competing passion, it is obvious that one would encounter the same problem again or be led to an infinite 
regress. But now suppose, as I have suggested earlier, that the incontinent man does not know that he has 
these derived obligations. Since in this case he does not know that he ought to take certain steps which 
themselves are necessary in order that he be able to adhere to the initial moral principle, one wonders why 
Aristotle would say that the incontinent man is blameworthy, as he does at 1145b 10.
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Aristotle does avoid the inconsistency in the way that I have suggested he is still left with a significant 
problem. But there is an answer to this. Aristotle does say that we are sometimes responsible for our 
ignorance. 
 
Indeed, we punish a man for his very ignorance, if he is thought responsible for the ignorance, as 
when penalties are doubled in the case of drunkenness; for the moving principle is in the man 
himself, since he had the power of not getting drunk and his getting drunk was the cause of his 
ignorance. And we punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws that they ought to know and 
that is not difficult, and so too in the case of anything else that they are thought to be ignorant of 
through carelessness; we assume that it is in their power not to be ignorant, since they have the power 
of taking care. (1113b 30 - 1114a 3). 
 
So on Aristotle's view there are some cases of ignorance for which one may be held blameworthy. And it 
certainly seems that one would be responsible for not knowing that he should take certain steps to enable him 
to ward off passions which are contrary to a moral principle and might be aroused. One surely ought to know 
the general circumstances in which he, as a moral agent, will operate. It seems quite reasonable to say that 
ignorance of this matter would be due to carelessness. So Aristotle can quite reasonably hold the incontinent 
man blame worthy for not knowing what steps to take to ward off such passions. So I think that my view can 
handle the first objection. 
 
A second worry that can be raised about the above account is the following. If being properly habituated is 
part of what is involved in full and complete knowledge, then Aristotle's account of incontinence may be 
such that it rules out by definition any possible counterexample. It would seem that any case to which one 
can point and say that it is an instance of an agent acting contrary to his moral principles, Aristotle can 
always reply that he has not been properly habituated and so is not acting contrary to full and complete 
knowledge. I agree that this objection is worrisome for Aristotle's account, but it is not clear that Aristotle 
would have thought so. After all, Aristotle defines the man of practical wisdom as one who always acts in 
accord with his universal moral principles 1144b 30-33). So too by definition one cannot act contrary to full 
and complete knowledge. It is ironic that Aristotle's account of akrasia is usually rejected as false because 
people do exhibit weakness of the will in cases he would not allow. But these cases are ones in which 
Aristotle would say that though the rational principle (or the end) may be right, the agent is not properly 
habituated (does not have the right means). It is thus not a case of incontinence because the agent does not 
have full and complete knowledge. So as it turns out it is more likely that Aristotle's view is philosophically 
suspect not because it is false but because it is unfalsifiable. It is not clear what might count as a 
counterexample to his view. There may, at least, be a way to correct this defect; there is no way to save a 
view that is patently false. 
 
Part V 
Finally, is there any way to read passage (C) so that it is consistent with the natural interpretation? Is there 
any way on the natural interpretation that there could be a genuine conflict between reason and appetite? If 
what I said in attempting to reconcile passage (A) with the natural interpretation is correct, then passage (C) 
can be handled too. (C), it will be recalled, is worrisome for two reasons. First, since the natural 
interpretation seems to rule out the possibility of the incontinent man being able to recognize at the time of 
his action that he is in a position to act on his general moral principles, it seems that he can not be moved to 
do so. In that case, the only operative motivation in the incontinent man will be appetite. Hence there can be 
no conflict of motives. lf, as I argued above, it is possible for one to know the moral principle, draw the 
conclusion that he ought to do A, and yet not have full and complete knowledge (and as a result sometimes 
fail to do what he ought to do), then it is possible that there could be a conflict between reason and appetite, 
though there could be no conflict if the agent had full and complete knolwedge. If there were a conflict in 
this latter case it would not really be genuine, since full and complete knowledge could not lose. The second 
worry that (C) presents is if appetite wins out in its conflict with reason, then knowledge has been dragged 
about like a slave. But this worry can be handled too. The reason that one can say that knowledge proper has 
not been dragged about like a slave is that the agent does not have full and complete knowledge. What the 
incontinent man lacks knowledge of, at least in some cases, is what I have called 'derived obligations'. As a 
result, he has not properly trained himself so that he can overcome certain temptations. He knows (at least in 
the propositional sense) what he ought to do, and so he is to some extent moved to do so. But not having 
trained himself sufficiently, appetite sometimes wins out. On this interpretation there is some sense in which 
the continent person has a more complete and fuller knowledge than does the incontinent person. And yet in 
another sense they both know the moral principle in question. So at least in the case of the weak incontinent 
man there can be a conflict between reason and appetite. Passage (C), therefore, is consistent with the 
extended version of the natural interpretation. 
 
It is important to note, I think, that the case which explains why (C) is not inconsistent with the extended 
version of the natural interpretation is just that case where the weak incontinent person knows the general 
moral principle that applies to his situation but may still act contrary to it, Unless being properly trained and 
habituated is part of knowledge proper, this is surely a case of knowledge being dragged about like a slave. 
As I have already indicated above, if one tries to reconcile (A) with the natural interpretation by positing a 
time lag between the time of one's deliberation and the time for action, and then claiming that perceptual 
knowledge may be lost during the interval (thus the weak person has not acted contrary to full and complete 
knowledge), one will not be able to handle passage (C), The only case where it is plausible to say that there 
is a genuine conflict of motivations is that case where the agent knows that the moral principle applies to his 
situation (and so, to an extent, is moved to act on that principle) but is still moved by the appetites to act 
contrary to the principle. Thus the reconciliation of passages (A) and (C) with the natural interpretation 
hangs on the same point, and this is not merely coincidental. 
 
I should also note that my reading of (A) and (C) gives one an additional way to handle passage (B), though, 
as I have said, I think that it can be handled independently. (B) says that the incontinent man is aware of his 
incontinence. If one can know a moral principle without knowing all of the steps that one ought to take to 
ward off any potentially conflicting desire, then one can be aware at the time of his action that he is behaving 
incontinently and still not be acting contrary to full and complete knowledge. All that I have shown, though, 
is that the weak incontinent man can be aware of his incontinence at the time of his action. It seems that for 
the impetuous incontinent man a time lag is necessary. But this is not inconsistent. It simply shows that the 
weak incontinent man can be aware of his incontinence in a way that the impetuous man cannot. Notice, 
though, that if one takes the first line of reasoning in handling passage (A), one cannot allow for this 
additional way of reconciling passage (B). According to the first account the weak incontinent person is not 
aware at the time of his action that the moral principle in question applies to his case. So he could not at that 
time be aware that he was behaving contrary to the principle. This seems to be one more reason for favoring 
the second way of handling (A). 
 
I think, then, that passages (A), (B), and (C) are consistent with the natural interpretation. Having first 
considered passage (B), we saw immediately that there is a very simple way to reconcile it with the usual 
way of reading Aristotle. One need only to suppose that there is a time lag and that the incontinent person is 
aware of his incontinence only after-the-fact. Since the impetuous man could only be aware of his 
incontinence after-the-fact (and must be aware of it in order to repent), one has good textual grounds for 
reading in the time lag. One may wonder, though, why it turns out that with regard to the weak incontinent 
person one does not need to read in the time lag. The reason for this, I think, is that Aristotle's fourth case 
1147a  25 - 1147b 19), which can be taken as an explanation of akrasia, is, as it stands, an explanation of 
impetuous incontinence only. Aristotle explicitly says (1147b 10-18) that the incontinent man either does not 
have knowledge of some particular circumstance or has it only in the way that the drunk does. For this 
reason knowledge proper is not being dragged about like a slave. The defect in the agent's knowledge 
explained here is just the defect that the impetuous man has. Even if Aristotle had only allowed for 
impetuous incontinence, passage (B) would still have appeared troublesome. But in showing how the 
impetuous man can be aware of his incontinence, one has also shown how the weak person might be aware 
of it after-the-fact. In resolving the difficulties that passages (A) and (C) present, however, one sees an 
additional way that the weak incontinent person may be aware of his incontinence and it is at the time of his 
action. 
 
Once Aristotle has introduced the notion of weak incontinence we see that his explanation of akrasia in the 
fourth case is incomplete. His general point that action contrary to knowledge proper is not possible still 
holds. But on the basis of Aristotle's fourth case, it has been thought that the only way that one could behave 
contrary to his moral principles is if at the moment of his action he did not know that the act was wrong. But 
passages (A) and (C) are inconsistent with this. In explaining how the weak man is able to act against his 
general moral principles, one must emphasize that on the Aristotelian story one does not have knowledge 
proper until one's moral principles are fully integrated into his character and a definite part of himself. This 
happens only when one sees to it that he is properly trained and habituated. So with regard to the three 
passages in question, Aristotle's account of incontinence is not inconsistent; but it is more complicated than it 
initially appears to be, 
 
Footnotes 
* In writing this paper I have benefited greatly from discussions with and the critical comments of Professors 
Norman O. Dahl and Vicki L. Harper. I should particularly note that in setting out the problem (sections I 
and II) that I discuss here closely follow Professor Dahl's account in his unpublished paper "Aristotle on 
Practical Reason and Weakness of the Will." 
1. All references to the Nichomachean Ethics are to the W.D. Ross translation. 
2. Gerasimos Santas, in his paper "Aristotle on Practical Inference, the Explanation of Action, and 
Akrasia," Phronesis, Vol. 14 (1969), pp. 162-189, views this case in this way, as does Professor Dahl 
in his paper. 
3. Santas, p. 182. 
4. There is also a passage in De Anima (434a 12-14) which can be construed in the same way that I have 
suggested that passage (C) be construed. This passage, however, is somewhat obscure and the 
interpretation of it is quite controversial. 
5. Santos, in the paper referred to above, and Anthony Kenny, in his paper "The Practical Syllogism and 
Incontinence," Phronesis, Vol. 11 (1966), pp. 163-184, both attempt to deal with some of these 
puzzles and closely related matters. Though I do not critically discuss their accounts in my paper, 
except for a small part of Santas's paper, I am not entirely convinced that either of their accounts can 
adequately handle all of the apparently inconsistent passages. Of course, the reader must decide this 
for himself. 
6. It seems to me that one must take this passage to refer to all incontinent men. The reason for this is 
that the paragraph in which it occurs is intended to set off the incontinent man – not just some 
incontinent men – from the vicious one. 
7. I do not give any arguments for construing incontinence as a disposition. I should point out, though, 
that others have also taken it as a disposition. James J. Walsh, in Chapter IV, particularly p. 95, of 
Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness (Columbia University Press, 1963), also construes 
incontinence as a disposition, though as far as I can tell he does not give an argument for this 
interpretation either. In opposition to this general view, Donald Davidson, in his "How is Weakness 
of the Will Possible?'', Moral Concepts (Oxford University Press, 1970), ed. Joel Feinberg, pp. 96-97, 
claims that for Aristotle weakness of the will cannot be a character trait. 
8. Santas, pp. 184-185. 
9. Santas, p. 185. This assumes that the conclusion of one's deliberation is a resolution rather than an 
action. 
10. This objection was pointed out to me by Norman Dahl. The response that I make to it was suggested 
to be by Vicki Harper. 
